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Introduction 
 
ildlife Services is a subbranch of the U.S. Department of Agriculture that 
primarily operates in the Western half of the United States, receiving 100 
million dollars of federal funding annually. One of the “services” that 
the agency provides is the slaughter of 100,000 native carnivores per year 
(primarily coyotes, wolves, bears, and mountain lions). This killing is 
accomplished with traps, poison, and, most dramatically, by gunning animals 
down from planes and helicopters; it takes place on public lands that are set apart, 
among other purposes, as habitat for just such creatures.  The main purpose of the 
program is to prevent loss of livestock grazing on or adjacent to public lands, and 
the killing enjoys strong support among ranchers. Nevertheless, the effectiveness 
of the program remains highly questionable. Only a tiny percentage of livestock 
losses result from predation, and killing major predators has occasionally, among 
other unintended consequences, increased reproduction rates in targeted 
populations. With huge costs and marginal benefits, it seems clear that cultural 
forces larger than the program’s stated goals sustain such biopolitical slaughter. 
Some latent animosity maintains this longstanding war on carnivorous neighbors.  
 
In its critical moment, this essay seeks to name the political ecology that compels 
and validates the actions of Wildlife Services—or the more familiar abject 
exploitation of nonhuman animals in factory farming and medical 
experimentation. Through the lens of political theology, this excessive and 
shortsighted animosity toward nonhuman animals represents a secularized legacy 
of the theological tradition of anthropological exceptionalism (often rooted in the 
imago dei) transformed and amplified through the Enlightenment. Beyond the 
ecological context, neither the animosity nor the exceptionalism under 
consideration here follow the boundaries of the human species. The normative 
conception of humanity at the heart of anthropological exceptionalism also drives 
the cultural logic of racialized and gendered hierarchies through the association of 
some human beings with animality, such that the social benefits of “full humanity” 
are unevenly distributed.  
 
In its constructive moment, this essay seeks to imagine an alternative political 
ecology by attending to the thought of Sylvia Wynter, Saidiya Hartman, and 
Delores Williams. These scholars, as Black feminists, each attend to gradations and 
slippages within normative conceptions of humanity that thinkers more 
commonly associated with political theology—such as Carl Schmitt and Giorgio 
Agamben—pass over. One of the wagers of this essay, then, is that the thought of 
W 
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Wynter, Hartman, and Williams (among others) provides better guidance for the 
constructive work of political theology—especially a theology that takes stock of 
human interaction with nonhuman creatures. Taking Wildlife Service’s systematic 
slaughter as a touchstone example, both the critical and constructive portions of 
this essay will focus on normative conceptions of humanity in relation to proposals 
for “democracy” as a paradigm for the transformation of human-nonhuman 
political relations.   
 
There is an impulse—especially within ecological thought and ecologically-
attuned political theology, to turn toward democracy as the conceptual model 
through which we might best resist the exploitative degradation of Earth’s living 
creatures and their ecosystems. While I agree that explicitly political analysis 
provides the best theological approach to ecological concerns, I grow increasingly 
skeptical of democracy as the best model for transforming relations between human 
and nonhuman creatures. In large part, as this essay will demonstrate, this 
skepticism arises through a unique convergence of postsecular and decolonial 
analysis that fragments and particularizes purportedly universal concepts such as 
‘nature,’ ‘humanity,’ ‘liberty,’ and ‘sovereignty.’ Of course, postsecular and 
decolonial discourses are not entirely aligned, but both have pressed poignant 
questions for the Enlightenment humanist tradition that nourishes modern liberal 
democracy. This essay attends to the thought of Black feminist authors in order to 
highlight an alternative framework for a political theology that resists ecological 
degradation, briefly sketching a postsecular and posthumanist political ecology 
marked by the fragmentation of any singular sovereignty into a pluralism of 
differentiated creaturely sovereignties. Democracy is not the only way of 
imagining divine justice in creation and may not be the best one.  
 
 
Humanity as a Political Concept 
 
To begin, I’d like to interrogate a basic claim in the thought of Nazi political 
theorist, Carl Schmitt. Schmitt argues that, “Humanity is not a political concept 
[because] no political entity…corresponds to it.”1 Of course, for Schmitt, politics 
comes down to judgments about the distinction between friend and enemy—those 
with whom I can form alliance and those who, if it comes down to it, I can kill—
just as ethics comes down to judgments between good and evil, aesthetics to 
beauty and ugliness, and economics to profitability.2 For Schmitt, any political use 
of the concept “humanity” is cynical and depoliticizing because humanity “has no 
enemy, at least not on this planet.”3 Properly political concepts mark off the 
boundaries of enmity and, for Schmitt, “humanity” obscures these boundaries by 
falsely appealing to a category that relativizes antagonisms without providing any 
concrete structure that would resolve them. Since “humanity” as such is never an 
actor in political struggle, those who purport to act in the name of humanity are 
always obfuscating the lines of actual antagonisms. Schmitt regards humanism—
claims to act on behalf of humanity as a whole—as primarily a mechanism for 
                                               
1 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007), 54-55. 
2 Schmitt, Concept of the Political, 25-26. 
3 Schmitt, Concept of the Political, 54. 
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concealing and validating the violence of one group against another. Schmitt 
rejects such appeals to humanity because the task of politics is to sharpen the lines 
of enmity, providing a context for explicitly defined struggle, rather than 
diplomatically relativizing such antagonism.  
 
Reading Schmitt’s text with an eye toward the ecological politics of the 
Anthropocene Era—in which earth’s species are driven to extinction with a 
species-death toll a hundredfold higher than historic rates—renders the claim that 
humanity has no earthly enemy dubious. Minimally, enmity is an illuminating 
category with which to think about humanity’s relationship to creation. Such 
enmity is likely not reciprocal, but the global scale of accelerating ecological 
degradation testifies that humanity has made the Earth and its creatures to be an 
enemy. Schmitt is not only wrong to insist that humanity is not a political concept, 
“humanity” is in many regards the originary concept of Western politics insofar as 
every political order—every particular delineation of enemy and friend—
simultaneously operates as a differentiation of the human community from the 
natural world.4  
 
My first point, then, is to insist that humanity is a political concept on Schmitt’s 
own terms because humanity generates and sustains enmity.  Schmitt writes, “The 
political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear 
as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him 
in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is 
sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially 
something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are 
possible.”5 On this definition, the paradigmatic enemy must be the animal living 
just outside the city gate.6 We have learned to regard nonhuman animals as 
essentially different and alien, categorically other-than-human, so that points of 
commonality surprise and amuse us, rather than causing us to reflect on a 
fundamental ecological or evolutionary commonality. Moreover, our “commerce” 
with nonhuman animals is exploitatively asymmetrical—so much so that violent 
conflict is more a basic presupposition than an “extreme case.” Hobbes aptly 
indicates the fundamental enmity toward animality within the Western political 
order, claiming that “one may at discretion reduce to one’s service any animals 
that can be tamed or made useful, and wage continual war against the rest as 
harmful, and hunt them down and kill them.”7 It is no accident, then, that Wildlife 
Services has turned the mechanisms of war—planes, poisons, and firearms—
                                               
4 Writing The Concept of the Political in the 1930s, Schmitt does not consider ecology 
explicitly, but his brief discussion of animal fables demonstrates at least a peripheral 
awareness of the fundamental differentiation of human political life from the life of the 
natural world; 58-59. 
5 Schmitt, Concept of the Political, 27. 
6 Gregoire Chamayou’s account of Schmitt’s antihumanism in relation to his discussion of 
the European conquest of the “New World” helpfully highlights animality as the 
paradigm of enmity. Both reactionary antihumanists such as Schmitt and the Christian 
humanists that Schmitt elides (De Las Casas, for example) assume the unquestionable 
legitimacy of hunting down and killing nonhuman creatures. See Manhunts: A Philosophical 
History, trans. Steven Rendall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 37-42. 
7 Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. and trans. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 105-6, 
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against those nonhuman animals that cause even minimal and incidental harm to 
human endeavors.  
 
Even if our better intentions and rosier self-conceptions would indicate otherwise, 
the material effects of human presence on the biosphere testify to an asymmetrical 
enmity between humans and other creatures in which creaturely life is generally 
devalued and disregarded, largely in pursuit of short-term gain. The kernel of 
truth in Schmitt’s aphorism is that claims to represent the interests of humanity as 
whole invariably serve the interests of some smaller, unspecified set of human 
beings. So here, I should already specify that human enmity with nonhuman life 
is not homogenous; its sharpest relief appears around those human beings most 
fully integrated into the globalized market economy. Human enmity levied 
against Earth’s creatures arises from particular modes of being human endemic to 
globalized capitalism and is alien to most indigenous and subsistence cultures. Yet 
dominant modes of being human have inundated and co-opted so many 
alternatives better accommodated to sustainable coexistence with nonhuman 
creatures. Thus, while Schmitt is right to assert that there is no single unified 
political “we” that corresponds to humanity as a whole, mainstream concepts of 
“humanity” mobilize violent enmity with an unmatched efficacy.   
 
Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer similarly omits animality from proper political 
consideration. For Agamben, the originary relation in Western politics is the 
production of bare life.8 Western politics produces bare life in two ways: First, bare 
life functions as a mythical Ur-concept marking political life as better than the 
brute life that “preceded” it. Bare life is a false memory that validates political 
order (as bad as our political systems may be, we are still better off than the state 
of nature from which we mythologically emerged). Second, politics produces bare 
life by exclusion, ceremoniously denuding people of the law’s protection and 
exposing them to whatever death or misfortune might befall them. This political 
“baring” of lives that exposes them to harm, menacingly reinforces the 
legitimation of the founding myth.  Politics is a self-perpetuating game that 
operates through an inclusive exclusion: bare life is taken up into the city to be 
politically transformed into civilization while the mechanisms of politics 
simultaneously expel and exclude bare life as the constitutive outside to civilized 
life. This fundamental ambiguity reveals that bare life doesn’t exist “out there” 
waiting to be organized, but is the constructed concept over which the edifice of 
Western politics suspends itself. The state of nature never existed except where 
human politics created it; it is an idea—and a routinely enacted threat—that 
validates our political order and justifies its brutality by positing an even worse 
state of affairs as a mythological background. 
 
Agamben argues that Western political order is built on the theory and practice of 
inclusive exclusion, most readily visible in the “ban” that exiles someone from the 
subjection and subjectivity offered under the law. Extending Foucault’s analysis 
of biopolitics, Agamben demonstrates an “inner solidarity” between democracy 
and totalitarianism.9 Agamben posits a homology between the political/legal logic 
                                               
8 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 8. 
9 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 10, 148, 181-2, 188. 
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that produced the Roman homo sacer—a designation that marked someone who 
could be killed, but neither murdered (a killing subject to punishment) nor 
sacrificed (a killing productive of meaning)—and that of twentieth century state-
perpetrated genocides, which begin with the removal or denial of citizenship to 
target populations. The subjectivity formed through Western political order comes 
into relief through naming (and producing) that which stands outside the law. 
Because of its dire consequences, the ban’s political effectiveness is at work even 
when it is only a threat.10  
 
Liberal democracies remain preferable to totalitarian regimes, but Agamben 
demonstrates that in their production and regulation of bare life, both systems are 
alternate configurations of pieces on the same political chess board, rather than 
different games. One may slide into the other with surprising ease. Yet Agamben 
fails to recognize several inclusive-exclusions operating within Homo Sacer, both 
of which are important for the purposes of this essay. First, as Alexander 
Weheliye’s excellent book Habeas Viscus makes clear, Agamben’s description of the 
operation of the ban and the production of bare life presume universality, and so 
fail to account for racialized and gendered patterns in which lives are most often 
subject to the ban and which lives are disproportionately bared.11 “Bare life” is 
never nondescript, and not all lives are bared in the same way and with the same 
frequency, so Weheliye makes clear that the production and regulation of bare life 
are inseparable from the violent logics of racialization and engendering. 
Agamben’s analysis remains entirely myopic on this point.  
 
Second, the omission of animals and animality from Homo Sacer remains striking, 
given the book’s concentration on “bare life.”12 Human politics subject animal lives 
to constitutive ambiguities as pervasively as they do human beings. I would argue 
that on Agamben’s logic in Homo Sacer, the human collaboration that colonizes, 
exploits, and excludes animals represents a political relation more originary than 
the (intra-human) practice of the ban. Through domestication or exploitation, 
select animals are knit into the socio-political order as the foundation of 
agriculture and commerce; such bare lives are politically transformed through 
inclusion. Other animals (and any animals of the former category who resist their 
placement within the political order), stand outside the law, subject to 
unimpugnable killing that is neither murder nor sacrifice. Returning to Wildlife 
Services for a moment, the inclusive exclusion of the cow within the human 
                                               
10 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 28-29, 83, 109, 181. 
11 Alexander Weheliye, Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist 
Theories of the Human (Durham: Duke UP, 2014), especially chs. 2 and 4. 
12 Matthew Calarco correctly perceives that every figure Agamben uses to represent the 
new politics he seeks is essentially human, whether the refugee, the “whatever 
singularity,” or the Musselmann. Calarco, “On the Borders of Language and Death: 
Agamben and the Question of the Animal,” Philosophy Today 44 (2000): 96-97. Calarco’s 
criticism is only overcome, I believe, by reading Agamben’s oeuvre in light of another text, 
namely, The Open (2004); see my argument in “The Logos of God and the End of Man: 
Animality as Light and Life,” in Divinanimality: Animal Theory, Creaturely Theology, ed. 
Stephen Moore (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), 146-60. In a later book, 
Calarco himself recognizes this broadening in Agamben’s work; see Zoographies: The 
Question of the Animal From Heidegger to Derrida (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2008), 90-103. 
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political order (as living meat) differs from the exclusive inclusion of the coyote or 
wolf (as enemies and targets of state-sanctioned violence), but the human 
approach to both animals establishes and polices the boundary of political order 
as we conceive it.  Distinctions between killing, murder, slaughter, and sacrifice 
are worked out, first and foremost, through animal blood. Victims of routinized, 
systemic violence are almost always animalized first, because of widespread 
social, legal, and religious acceptance of routine violence against animals as non-
culpable. The political threat of the “ban” in both its ancient and contemporary 
configuration is that it reduces a human being to the state of “living like an animal” 
or being consigned to the space of the animals—exposed to the beasts and living 
like the beasts.   
 
Even so, animal life is not bare of political order, though it has often been theorized 
as such. The outer edge of human politics is not the edge of political order per se 
insofar as social animals (wolves, whales, apes, prairie dogs) clearly order their 
lives together in culturally-mediated ways that improve their collective lot. Even 
wild animals are always already political—there is no bare life “outside” political 
order since ecology is politics all the way down.  
 
Agamben’s tacit identification of politics with an undifferentiated and universal 
human condition obscures three things: (1) the racialized and gendered gradients 
within the biopolitical production of bare life, (2) the varied and complex political 
arrangements of nonhuman animals, and (3) the inclusive exclusion of animality 
as the originary relation of Western political logic. Seeing these omissions in Homo 
Sacer makes it clear that Agamben describes not the origin of politics as such, but 
the origin of “humanity” as an operative political norm, a quality or category that 
can be allocated and denied to creatures (both human and nonhuman) in varying 
degrees and in varying ways. While Schmitt fails to see enmity with nonhuman 
creatures through his denial of humanity as a political category with any 
substantial content, Agamben aptly demonstrates the operation of “humanity” as 
a content-laden political norm. Yet by failing to take stock (at least in Homo Sacer) 
of the internal differentiation and the outer limits of bare humanity as a political 
concept, Agamben’s account of Western politics overlooks the production and 
perpetuation of racialized, gendered, and ecological exploitations.  In contrast, 
Sylvia Wynter remains rigorously attentive to gradients and textures in the 
deployment of humanity as a political concept, accounting for the ways that 
certain conceptual configurations of humanity inculcate the deep-seated enmities 
and exclusions that Agamben passes over in Homo Sacer.  
 
Key within Wynter’s thought is her assertion that “humanity” only ever names a 
particular genre of the human. As a noun, “humanity” aspires to name a natural 
kind, to encompass the entire species of homo sapiens in a universal and 
undifferentiated way. But in political and economic discourse “humanity” always 
names a particular kind of human or a particular mode of being human. Concern 
about anthropogenic climate change is misdirected when it focuses on the role of 
an undifferentiated and universalized “humanity” in atmospheric transformation; 
or as Wynter puts it, “The Masai who were (and are) being displaced have nothing 
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to do with global warming.”13 In practice, “humanity” does not name a collective 
noun so much as a praxis—a “thick” and culturally inflected way of being human 
that seldom acknowledges its historical and cultural particularity.  
 
Yet our notions of humanity, and the stories that we tell about humanity as a 
natural kind, are tremendously powerful formative ideals—they frame basic self-
understanding, notions of sanity/insanity, self-interest, and propriety. The “we” 
of common discourse that presumes to speak for/from humanity is always less 
universally representative and more deeply formative than acknowledged. And 
these contours of humanity as a praxis entail that there are gradients of humanity, 
degrees of conformity and divergence. As Judith Butler argues:  
 
‘The human’ works as a differential norm: let us think of the 
human as a value and a morphology that may be allocated and 
retracted, aggrandized, personified, degraded and disavowed, 
elevated and affirmed. The norm continues to produce the nearly 
impossible paradox of a human who is no human, or of the human 
who effaces the human as it is otherwise known….The term 
‘human’ is constantly doubled, exposing the ideality and coercive 
character of the norm: some humans qualify as human; some 
humans do not.14  
 
“Humanity” then, in addition to indicating a natural kind—the sum total of the 
members of Homo sapiens—also operates as a powerful ideological regime that 
arranges gradients and hierarchies. Wynter genealogically traces out two of the 
most powerful historical configurations of “humanity”—taking stock of their 
deeply gendered and racialized contours—and names them Man1 (homo religiosus 
and the human subject of the Enlightenment) and the currently regnant Man2 
(homo oeconomicus). For Wynter, the term “Man” designates these conceptions of 
humanity as overrepresented, normative genres of human life that have obscured 
and undermined other modes of humanity whose presentation does not conform 
to normative standards of behavior, racialized hierarchies, and gender roles.15  
 
More pervasively and more powerfully than either Schmitt or Agamben, Wynter 
analyses “humanity” as an originary political concept—contested and contestable 
even as (or rather, because) it names a natural kind. By exposing social norms that 
that inculcate “Man” as the paradigmatic mode of subjectivity, Wynter charts the 
social, psychic, and corporeal violence of inclusive exclusion—a ceaseless pressure 
toward impossible conformity alternating with avowed enmity toward that which 
cannot be assimilated into the order of Man. One arena of this deep-seated enmity 
                                               
13 Sylvia Wynter and Katherine McKittrick, “Unparalleled Catastrophe for Our Species? 
Or, to Give Humanness a Different Future: Conversations,” in Sylvia Wynter: On Being 
Human As Praxis, ed. Katherine McKittrick (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 21. 
14 Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (New York: Verso, 2010), 76-77; see 
also Wynter, “Catastrophe,” 33-34. 
15 Wynter, “Catastrophe,” 31; “Unsettling the Coloniality of 
Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—
An Argument,” New Centennial Review 3, no. 3 (2003): 281-82 
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is visible in the violence of Wildlife Services as well as the more quotidian 
violences of industrial agriculture or the various regimes of animal 
experimentation. By explicitly recognizing “humanity” as a fundamental and 
contestable political concept, Wynter is already thinking ecologically in ways that 
escape both Schmitt and Agamben.  
 
Wynter also outlines a program of resistance to the violent overrepresentation of 
Man, a program to which I mean to return toward the end of the essay. First 
however, I will examine one common eco-political response to anthropocentrism 
within environmentally attuned literature, namely the notion of a planetary multi-
species democracy. If humanity is the originary concept of Western politics and, 
as Wynter demonstrates, a concept linked to a disavowedly normative and 
unevenly distributed praxis, then the foregoing discussion might give us pause 
around even the well-meaning use of ideals like democracy. These proposals for a 
multispecies democracy are generally driven by post humanist or anti-humanist 
impulses, yet in light of the analysis above, I wonder whether they are only in a 
more distant orbit around a humanism ordered to Man’s interests. Wynter’s work, 
along with that of other Black feminist thinkers, provides an important 
critique/corrective to democracy as the horizon for ecopolitical aspirations.  
 
Posthumanist Eco-Democracies? 
 
Appeals to an ecological democracy come from scholars with a wide variety of 
disciplinary commitments and approaches. Alfred North Whitehead, already in 
1929, argues that human beings are wrapped up in a “democracy of fellow 
creatures.”16 Aldo Leopold, uses the language of political representation, if not 
democracy as such, when he calls for a transformation from “man the conqueror” 
to “man the biotic citizen.”17 Similarly, Lynn White, of “Historical Roots of our 
Ecologic Crisis” fame, suggests that human beings are already part of a “spiritual 
democracy of all creatures.”18 Vandana Shiva imagines the possibilities for an 
“earth democracy.”19 Theologian Peter Scott argues for a representational politics 
that would “extend democratic, rather than moral, considerability to nonhuman 
nature.”20 Bruno Latour imagines a “parliament of things” that overcomes the 
                                               
16 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 50; 
see also, Rebekah Sinclair, “A Democracy of Fellow Creatures: Thinking the Animal, 
Thinking Ethics in Whitehead’s Philosophy of Organism,” Process Studies 42, no. 2 (2013): 
200-220. 
17 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac: And Sketches Here and There (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1949), 204. 
18 Lynn Townsend White Jr., “Continuing the Conversation,” in Western Man and 
Environmental Ethics: Attitudes toward Nature and Technology, ed. Ian Barbour (Reading, MA: 
Addison Wesley, 1973), 61; see also, Matthew Riley, “A Spiritual Democracy of All God’s 
Creatures: Ecotheology and the Animals of Lynn White Jr.,” in Divinanimality: Animal 
Theory, Creaturely Theology (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), 243. 
19 Vandana Shiva, Earth Democracy: Justice Sustainability and Peace (Cambridge, MA: South 
End Press, 2005). 
20 Peter Scott, A Political Theology of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
222-23. 
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modern separation between nature and society.21 And, recently Catherine Keller 
has taken Whitehead’s phrase, the “democracy of fellow creatures,” as the title for 
an article on eco-feminism.22  
 
To be clear, I start from a position of basic agreement with these proposals. For 
many of these authors, “democracy” is shorthand for a heightened empathy that 
generates less stratified, more reciprocal relations between human beings and 
nonhuman creatures. Those proposals situated in the discourse of political 
theology reflect the conviction that the power and justice of God are diffuse and 
widely distributed in creation, sprouting up among the “least” of Earth’s creatures 
rather than cascading down the steps of a clearly delineated hierarchy. My goals 
and vision are substantially similar. Because ecological degradation is a function 
of the use and abuse of power, I am already persuaded that political analysis is 
theology’s best approach to ecological questions (rather than approaches that 
center on value, sacredness, enchantment, or a narrow voluntaristic-
individualistic ethics). Nevertheless, the frequency with which specific appeals to 
democracy appear in ecologically concerned scholarship merits additional 
scrutiny for the idea.  
 
Locating the lives of all creatures within a cosmic democracy clearly employs 
human language and trades in human politics; metaphor is all that we have. My 
questions about democracy are not about arriving at the “real” description of 
humanity’s political relation to nonhuman creatures, but as with any metaphor, it 
is a question of the adequacies and failures of different framings. Is democracy a 
particularly helpful way of thinking about Western interactions with creaturely 
neighbors? What do these appeals to democracy illuminate? What do they 
conceal?  
 
As a metaphor, democracy seeks to name the inescapable interdependence of all 
creatures on one another for basic life functions like respiration and nutrition. For 
the most part, these arguments make the claim that humanity is already embedded 
within a planetary democracy that is negated or betrayed by the human political 
economy. So, with occasional exceptions, it is less an argument about extending 
democracy to the natural world than recognizing a democracy that is already 
there. This pattern of thought allows democracy to serve as both the bedrock of 
ecological politics and as the aspirational horizon of possibility for redeemed 
human relationships to the natural world.23  
 
                                               
21 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1993), 143-44. 
22 Catherine Keller, “A Democracy of Fellow Creatures: Feminist Theology and Planetary 
Entanglement.” Studia Theologica 69, no. 1 (2015): 1-16. 
23 Talal Asad illuminates the necessary reliance of purportedly secular liberal democracies 
on mythology that relativizes inequality by setting it against the background of a perfectly 
equitable origin and the aspiration of an equitable future; see chapter 1 of Formations of the 
Secular: Christianity, Islam, and Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 
especially 56-61. Asad’s work here is in conversation with Margaret Canovan, “On Being 
Economical with the Truth: Some Liberal Reflections,” Political Studies 38, no. 1 (1990): 5-
19. 
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However, interdependence is a function of many political orders other than 
democracy, and not all interdependence is benign. Rather than democracy, current 
globalized capitalist modes of human interaction with creation bear stronger 
resemblance to colonial or feudal exploitation, than to any submerged and 
corrupted democracy. If this is the case, might the primary function of appeals to 
an invisible or submerged (but nevertheless fundamental) democracy be to 
provide personal exemptions from structural problems along the lines of a 
counterproductive romanticism regarding the “pristine” and the “wild”?  
 
I have two concerns with appeals to ecological democracy. First, I worry that 
appeals to democracy obscure the asymmetrical relations of power that are 
generated and maintained by the operation of “humanity” as a political category.  
In any other political context, scholars are quick to raise suspicion when a tiny 
minority wields enormously disproportionate power and simultaneously appeals 
loudly to the values and virtues of democracy. Such suspicion is warranted in this 
case as well. These appeals to democracy—though they are not advanced in bad 
faith—play too easily toward hand-wringing romanticism about “nature” as the 
site of an ecological harmony and balance that human beings (if we could just get 
our act together) could rejoin. At bottom, that ideology is an obfuscation of 
actually-existing creaturely politics, a disavowal sustained by the promise of a 
perpetually deferred utopian order, and a kind of armchair eco-politics that cannot 
survive extended contact with actual creaturely relations, human or nonhuman.  
 
Additionally, I wonder whether, as a concept, democracy is sufficiently 
independent from the political operation of Man (to return to Wynter’s term) to 
provide leverage against it. In a democracy, a demos governs itself by means of a 
superstructure that represents, in one way or another, the interests of the 
governed. Most often, this very superstructure determines the composition and 
scope of the demos whose interests are represented. The mechanisms of 
democracy—its models of agency and representation—generate intense pressures 
toward conformity and homogeneity. The interests of minority (or minoritarian) 
populations are taken into account when they are translated into registers of desire 
and expediency that are recognizable from the subject position of the majority.24 
The unity of the demos is enforced as often as it is expressed. As an ideological 
apparatus, “humanity” operates with a similar pressure toward conformity. Since 
“humanity” always names a culturally particular praxis, actually existing 
democracies impress the values and virtues of Man (and his cognates, civilization 
and progress). If, as argued above, “Man” names a political order founded on the 
exclusion of animality, then entrusting the long and short term interests of 
nonhuman populations to representation within an intensely human political 
order is unlikely to significantly ameliorate current patterns of ecological 
degradation. Further, the problems of minoritarian representation are doubled 
insofar as many of the proposals for ecological democracies explicitly designate 
human figures as political representatives for nonhuman subjects (the “voices of 
                                               
24 With reference to Muslims in Europe, Asad discusses the problems of representation for 
minoritarian populations at length in chapter 5 of Formations of the Secular, 159-80, see also 
5. 
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the voiceless”).25 To put it bluntly, citizens (and denizens) of democracies whose 
ways-of-life do not conform to the normative model are not well-served by the 
mechanisms of representation. The “space” in which representation occurs is 
never neutral and unmarked. A democracy of all creatures, in this light, looks 
remarkably like the inclusive exclusion at the heart of Western political logic.  
 
As a descriptor of ecological relations between human beings and nonhuman 
creatures, I doubt that democracy is a political concept capacious enough to 
recognize (in an effective way) the claims that nonhuman creatures might make 
against humanity. With a history of extinctions, habitat encroachment, and 
trafficking, these claims are not trivial, nor sufficiently addressed through 
superficial policy adjustments. Moreover, insofar as the politics of Man are 
thoroughly entrenched in a violent differentiation from animality, any demos that 
includes humanity as a founding member faces a nearly insurmountable challenge 
in overcoming humanity’s foundational enmity with animality. A democracy of 
all creatures would entail—and this, of course, is what its advocates are after—a 
thoroughgoing transformation of the praxis of humanity at the level of collective 
self-understanding and orientation to the world.  If a democracy of all creatures is 
the answer to anthropogenic ecological degradation, it will need to be a democracy 
in which humanity—if not human beings—is either excluded or radically 
transformed. Questions remain: Are there any political mechanisms through 
which democracy could eradicate current configurations of humanity, or is 
democracy finally another configuration of humanity itself? Are there alternate 
political models that might more clearly provide for the dismantling of Man and 
the reconfiguration of the praxis of humanity? 
 
 
The End of Man: Postsecular Political Transformation 
 
What would a politics without Man look like? Beyond the idea that humanity can 
have no enemies, Carl Schmitt’s more famous claim is that all the major concepts 
of political theory are secularized theological ideas. In most discussions of 
Schmitt’s claim, analogies between divine sovereignty and the sovereignty of the 
state enjoy the bulk of the attention. Yet, the foregoing analysis suggests that 
prevalent conceptions of humanity are secularized variants of Judeo-Christianity’s 
legacy of anthropological exceptionalism (centered in exclusive accounts of the 
imago dei).26 While postsecularism names the moment of a recognition that we have 
never been secular in all the ways that we thought, it also names an opening 
through which theological literacy and theological analysis might gain critical 
traction on political discourse at points that other disciplinary approaches slip 
over. The deconstruction (in the technical Derridean sense) of the image of God 
and theological assertions of categorical human difference from 
animals/animality are necessary steps toward an ecological politics with better 
                                               
25 The presumption that nonhuman animals are “voiceless” is neither obvious nor 
necessary. See my essay, “They Fell Silent When We Stopped Listening: Apophatic 
Theology and ‘Asking the Beasts’,” in Turning to the Heavens and the Earth: Theological 
Reflections on a Cosmological Conversion, Essays in Honor of Elizabeth A. Johnson, ed. Julia 
Brumbaugh and Natalia Imperatori-Lee (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2016), 26-44. 
26 For deeper discussion on this point, see Wynter, “Unsettling Coloniality,” 299-306. 
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prospects for the long term coexistence of human beings with creaturely 
neighbors. To carry out this deconstructive work thoroughly requires intimate 
familiarity with the biblical and theological heritage that knits together divine 
authority, anthropological exceptionalism, species distinctions, and political 
order.   
 
Although the democracy of all creatures names an eco-political aspiration that 
remains questionable because its romanticism and mechanisms of representation 
leave insufficient room for creaturely difference, the most common alternative 
view of nature’s politics (seen frequently in popular media) is equally insufficient. 
The politics of nature is not a single law dripping with blood, “red in tooth and 
claw.” It is not difficult to see this popular view at work in Wildlife Services’ 
slaughter of native carnivores. Representatives of the U.S. Government enter the 
state of nature to join the war of all against all, killing predators to make room for 
cattle. To read ecology romantically through the lens of democracy is undoubtedly 
a vast improvement over seeing the natural world as the brutish site of unending 
bloody struggle (to be subjugated and exploited), but it is perhaps still too unified. 
Recent work from Jane Bennett, Brian Massumi, Cynthia Willett, Gay Bradshaw, 
and Marc Bekoff demonstrates the variety and complexity of creaturely politics 
both in single-species communities and, just as commonly, in well-structured 
interspecies interactions.27 Coyotes, ravens, wolves, and bears live out complex 
political alliances and wary antagonisms with other creatures, none of which 
neatly assimilate to the model of a representative democracy. What space could 
hope to encompass such complexity with a “one life, one vote” rule? There are 
many teeth, many claws, and so much fur and feathers, that a single political logic 
cannot possibly capture the pluriform structures of creaturely interaction.  
 
Against every binary division of Human vs. Animal—whether overtly theological 
or secularized in its presentation—a politics without humanity must begin from a 
multiplication of animal differences and a formal commitment to honor the 
pluriformity of creaturely worlds. Whether one derives such an image from 
Derrida or from Job, the ecological politics that emerges is less that of a single 
overarching ecosystemic democracy and more that of a nearly infinite collection 
of overlapping sovereignties.28 The conceptual difficulty within this framework is 
not—as with an ecological democracy—figuring out how to develop structures 
and models of representation for non-human creatures within the space of human 
politics, but instead is the challenge of negotiating relations between self-
determined populations sharing the same geography. The model for this latter 
challenge cannot be the clearly bounded and singular sovereignty of the nation 
                                               
27 Jane Bennett. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2010); Brian Massumi, What Animals Teach Us About Politics (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2014); Cynthia Willett, Interspecies Ethics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2014); G.A. Bradshaw, Elephants on the Edge: What Animals Teach Us About 
Humanity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce, Wild 
Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
28 Catherine Keller, Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming (New York: Routledge, 2003), 
124-40; Elizabeth Johnson, Ask the Beasts: Darwin and the God of Love (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2014), 149, 271; Jacques Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign I, trans. Geoffrey 
Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 14-15; The Beast and the Sovereign 
II, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 197-98. 
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state, but must look instead, something like the decolonial liberation of people 
whose interests are linked with, but not identical to, those of the broader 
population among whom they live. Ongoing struggles for cultural and political 
self-determination provide a different model for thinking about ecological politics.  
 
The coyote world operates on its own logic, has its own avenues into 
transcendence, and navigates a political terrain mapped with coyote cunning. The 
world’s creaturely peoples are interdependent, bound together in asymmetrical 
power relations, and only recognize boundaries mapped in the language of their 
own scents, calls, and movements. An ecological politics more adequate than the 
democracy of all creatures, in other words, conceives of nonhuman neighbors as 
self-determined (but not self-contained) peoples or cultures, each with a political 
order capable of its own integrity. The metaphor of democracy can only view 
nonhuman animals patronizingly as poorly-assimilated citizens within a single 
overarching order supposedly recognized by all.  
 
Here, I want to draw on the thought of Saidiya Hartman, Sylvia Wynter, and 
Delores Williams because, amidst all the differences between these thinkers, they 
share a commitment to a feminist decolonial politics of self-determination that 
demands the disintegration of any singular, normative, and overrepresented ideal 
of humanity. My wager is that the same politics capacious enough to struggle 
against white supremacist heteropatriarchy is also capacious enough to 
reconfigure political relations between overlapping creaturely populations. Black 
feminist thinkers—exemplary among many others—remind us that there are 
already versions of human life that resist and repudiate normative deployments 
of humanity by surviving otherwise, carving out space for another way of life 
where there seems to be no way.29  
 
Saidiya Hartman’s brilliant work Scenes of Subjection focuses on antebellum and 
Reconstruction America in order to trace out the treacherous underside of agency, 
subjectivity, personhood, and gender as conceptual tools of control and 
oppression. Hartman demonstrates not only that mainstream white America was 
never going to accept Emancipation as the fulfillment of founding ideals of 
equality but, far worse, that (finally) attributing full personhood and subjectivity 
to Black Americans enfolded them within an order where ostensibly equal 
humanity (according to the letter of the law) became a weapon that actually 
undermined legal protection in society and equal opportunity in life and labor. 
Agency was only recognized in the form of guilt (rather than liberty) and 
responsibility was figured only as reliable labor (rather than self-determination).30 
In other words “humanity” was extended primarily in punitive and exploitative 
ways. Black humanity remained ambiguous for mainstream white America, 
acknowledged only where it could be used to punish, restrict, and control.31 In 
such a context, Hartman demonstrates, resistance is both simpler and more 
complex than generally imagined. On the one hand, simply surviving is already 
                                               
29 Delores Williams, Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God-Talk (Maryknoll: 
Orbis, 1993), 2,6. 
30 Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-
Century America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 115-17, 125. 
31 Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, 5, 22, 118. 
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an act of resistance. Building relations of love and friendship, struggling together 
with others, and even the ordinary pleasures and pains of day-to-day life—these 
are all sites of resistance within a genocidal order. On the other hand, Hartman 
demonstrates that liberty, personhood, and humanity are not simply universal 
“goods” that can be claimed by the oppressed as an entry into equal standing. 
These basic concepts are already skewed, defined and delimited within an order 
of consciousness that denigrates and devalues Blackness.  
 
Sylvia Wynter draws the work of W.E.B. DuBois and Frantz Fanon together in 
order to think out strategies of resistance to just such an order of consciousness. 
Through Fanon, Wynter gives a stringent reading of DuBois notion of “double 
consciousness,” not simply as a symptom of living as a racialized subject within a 
racist society, but as the front line of a struggle, even a war, against the insidious 
influence of white supremacist logic as it informs the structure of consciousness 
itself. For Wynter, this struggle is not about overcoming “internalized racism”—
as if there were a subject who preexisted the racist order and could be lifted out of 
it—but instead about attending to the ways that Man already shapes the basic 
frameworks of self-understanding and self-perception.32 With Fanon, she 
repeatedly insists that “sociogeny is ontogeny”; our very being-as-human is 
socially formed. Man is not just a superficial set of cultural ideas about human life, 
but a script already being enacted in our basic self-understanding and daily habits. 
Resisting Man, then, requires three levels of struggle: (1) to expose and explain 
Man/humanity as a malleable, conditioned, culturally bound set of practices that 
are, nevertheless, deeply formative; (2) to transform material orders of domination 
insofar as these material conditions are the direct result/consequences of the 
praxis of “Man”; (3) to establish self-determination within and against an order of 
consciousness whose anthropology skews toward white supremacist 
heteropatriarchy.33  
 
Finally, Delores Williams’ classic theological text, Sisters in the Wilderness, works 
critically and imaginatively from the perspective of Hagar—a biblical figure 
usually folded into the story of Abraham and Sarah—whose survival and struggle 
for self-determination in the context of enslavement and sexual violence provide 
a powerfully motivating analogue for African American women. In both solidarity 
and antagonism, Hagar struggles with God, whom it is not obvious that she can 
trust, and makes a way for herself and her family through seemingly impossible 
opposition. Williams layers Hagar’s encounters with God, in which Hagar 
renames and refigures the deity associated with Abraham, with the works of Alice 
Walker and Ntozake Shange (“I found God in myself and I loved her fiercely”).34 
Like Hartman’s text, Williams book sustains a line of thought that is more critical 
and diagnostic than constructive. Nevertheless, her reflections on “Wilderness 
experience” and on the “Black Church” as an eschatological horizon work toward 
a more constructive proposal.35 Just as Hagar struggled with God and found a way 
in a wilderness that was at times sustaining and at times threatening, Williams 
pictures an ongoing struggle for self-determination that sometimes takes the form 
                                               
32 Wynter, “Catastrophe,” 49. 
33 Wynter, “Catastrophe,” 53-54. 
34 Williams, Sisters, 54-55. 
35 Williams, Sisters, 159-60, 205. 
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of attending to quality of life in survival and sometimes takes the form of 
revolutionary liberation.  
 
For the purposes of my argument, I want to attend to two points of commonality 
in Hartman, Wynter, and Williams’ work (a resonance that, I think, could be 
extended through many other thinkers). First, for all of these thinkers, prevailing 
conceptions of “humanity” remain oppressive, overly restrictive and insensitive 
to the lived experience of those bodies and minds to whom such prevailing 
conceptions were never meant to correspond. There is, in other words, a marking 
of enmity within a category whose universality and progressive humanist 
credentials frequently go unquestioned. Second, the political horizon of aspiration 
that emerges for each of these thinkers is not an expanding democracy that enfolds 
a larger and larger population within an overarching structure of representation 
and (benevolent) management. Rather, each of these thinkers builds spaces for 
coalitions of self-determination and alliance, smaller sovereignties that do much 
of the same flattening and de-hierarchicalizing work that the banner of 
“democracy” promises, but with an additional resistance to the homogenizing 
pressures toward conformity that unite and sustain the demos as a locus of power.  
 
Contention against the normative conceptions of humanity that nurture and 
sustain globalized capitalism remains an under-recognized but necessary 
component of any adequate cultural/political response to ecological degradation. 
This is the case, not least, because it is just such normative conceptions of humanity 
and human political order that generate the violent inclusive exclusions of animal 
life whereby both livestock and wild carnivores are caught—good as dead—in the 
web of human politics. Insofar as democracy is a mechanism for expanding and 
enforcing conformity to normative conceptions of humanity, ecologically-attuned 
thought must remain suspicious of democracy as a means for preservation and 
restoration. There is no doubt that successful campaigns of the environmental 
movement have utilized the representative and legislative mechanisms of 
democracy (the Wilderness Act of 1964 or the Endangered Species Act, for two 
examples), but I would argue that this approach has more to do with the 
dominance of democracy as a political framework than with the politics that 
generates the social and cultural momentum for such successes. The distinction 
here is a subtle one, but it has everything to do with human self-understanding in 
relation to animality. The politics of the environmental movement, when it is at its 
best, expresses the sovereign demands of local interspecies alliances rather than 
the managerial expertise of eco-bureaucrats. Human beings, caught up in relations 
of loyalty with nonhuman creatures, bend the movement of human political 
systems (ever so slightly) toward recognition of the interests of nonhuman 
creatures. From an ecological standpoint, the most important politics in this scene 
is not the representative and legislative work of the human democracy (however 
necessary that may be), but the formation of a creaturely alliance that escapes the 
orbit of normative humanity, preserving alternate ways-of-life oriented to distinct 
and variable ends. Such alliances, of course, exist even more frequently without 
human involvement (we call these alliances ecosystems), but where we are able to 
resist the humanity of Man, human beings too can inhabit—consciously and 
explicitly, if only for moments at a time—the politics of creaturely life.   
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At this postsecular moment, in theology’s contested and contentious intersections 
with politics and ecology, I would argue that Black feminist thought provides a 
better horizon of aspiration and struggle than anodyne appeals to a cosmic 
democracy. I want to be careful here. I am not arguing that Black feminist thought 
can be appropriated or “used” for a set of eco-political ends unrelated to the 
ongoing struggles for justice named by such works (to do so would be a profound, 
but all-too-common betrayal of these sources). Rather, I want to recognize Black 
feminist leadership and join the struggle identified in these works because this 
political vision is already better attuned ecologically than our dominant 
frameworks of political imagination. Part of the promise of the postsecular is a 
fragmentation that exposes the particular heritage of overarching concepts such as 
“nature,” “democracy,” and “humanity.” Theology, and political theology, then, 
arrive, newly chastened, into a world complicated by differences that had never 
been seen before—differences that the humanity of Man obscures through the 
normative overrepresentation of one particular mode or genre of being human. 
The eco-political work of attending to all that creaturely difference requires 
scrutiny regarding humanity as a political praxis—and “democracy” too—in order 
to respect the political worlds of coyotes and ravens, and negotiate a creaturely 
coexistence capable of sharing the earth without collapsing it into a single, all too 
human, world.  
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